Zero Indexer attestations

Independent observations of the experimental shims and hubs serving Zcash wallets. Check their enclave evidence, connection certificates and software release status.

TESTNET · EXPERIMENTAL

Registered endpoints: 1
Evidence + TLS verified: 1
Software releases matched: 1

Valid enclave evidence and a matching connection do not confirm the software release. Each check is reported separately.

ENDPOINT_OBSERVATIONS

Primary · 5 min / Canary · 1 min

Zec.rocks

shim

tee.testnet.unsafe.zec.rocks:443

Evidence verified

Enclave evidence: Verified
TLS certificate: Matched
Software release: Reproduced build matches

Canary observerSigned checks verified

Observed 2026-10-01 10:19:32 UTC · expires 2026-10-01 10:22:32 UTC

Last attempt 2026-10-01 10:19:52 UTC

Build, configuration & evidence

Running build: deploy-a67b428a-da024a0Reproduced matchCommit da024a0e3113
Configured hub: Not confirmedConfiguration does not prove live routing or hub availability.

Measurements below describe the last attempt. Unsigned source claims are separate from the reviewed build and configuration evidence above.

Deployment source tag; pinned to the reviewed commit. Running build · reproduced match.

Reviewed source commit: da024a0e3113810a4a10ffc085d43bb849f1a1a0

PCR0: 0f40593a4135162261a89b9057a26ae297d1a0d0a2b8c19c36d0b87db1f110581368c485bbde4c18723009af630e5ebd
PCR1: 0f40593a4135162261a89b9057a26ae297d1a0d0a2b8c19c36d0b87db1f110581368c485bbde4c18723009af630e5ebd
PCR2: 21b9efbc184807662e966d34f390821309eeac6802309798826296bf3e8bec7c10edb30948c90ba67310f7b964fc500a
TLS certificate SHA-256: bdaa6e30bfbb1d923942482c93a2ef113bcab0b229161bf7c3e50f97d2c46bb6
Attestation document SHA-256: 4a002a704a731389e265d9097becef4e129df7149d3bb717982654caee9cd765
Claimed source commit · unverified metadata: da024a0e3113810a4a10ffc085d43bb849f1a1a0
Signed timestamp: 2026-10-01 10:19:52 UTC
Last successful evidence and TLS check: 2026-10-01 10:19:52 UTC
Verifier: cipherscan-nitro-v1:ba0d0c57de673c8576c91a8730775a87575f5c10

Canary runs on ZecBlock’s server. Its signing keys are pinned by ZecBlock; the monitor itself is not enclave-attested. Both signatures, target evidence, reproduced measurements and TLS binding are checked separately.

Signed statement ↗Evidence ↗Public signing keys ↗Canary policy ↗Source & verification guide ↗

Registered source ↗Release baseline ↗Endpoint reference ↗Observation JSON ↗

Methodology & limitationsEvidence, software measurements and observer trust.

01 · Fresh enclave evidence

Each check sends a new random challenge. We validate the signed response against the AWS Nitro trust root, check its timestamp and reject debug measurements.

02 · A matching connection

The domain and certificate fingerprint inside the signed evidence must match the HTTPS connection used by our observer.

03 · A separate software check

Release verification needs independently established build measurements. Valid evidence alone does not confirm the expected software or prove that the software is safe.

Canary adds signed observations for endpoints with reproduced build measurements, checked every minute and expiring after three minutes. It runs on ZecBlock’s server with operator-pinned signing keys; Canary’s own runtime is not enclave-attested. Connection warnings remain visible even when a recent signed check passed.

These are periodic observations from ZecBlock, not verification of your wallet’s connection. A passing shim does not establish its hub’s status. Build tags identify reviewed source commits. A matching reproduced configuration can confirm a shim’s configured hub, but does not prove live routing or hub availability. The monitor does not measure transaction privacy, batching or wallet service uptime.

Attestation methodology ↗Verify a build yourself ↗Public JSON API ↗